Intercommunal tension in India has significantly heightened after the Hindu nationalist BJP government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi was re-elected by a large majority on 23 May 2019. Including also deputies from three local parties, the BJP formed the third National Democratic Alliance government of India. Since then the BJP party and the government are often perceived as targeting the Muslim minority for political gains.

The revocation of the special autonomy status of the Muslim majority state of Jammu and Kashmir under article 370 of the Indian constitution on 5 August 2019\(^2\) and the accompanying extensive security and police operations sparked a wide range of Muslim protest from the political to the civil and militant spectrum. *The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019* (CAA) which legalised Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi, and Christian migrants from neighbouring states fleeing persecution before 2014 pointedly excluded Muslims from its application. The introduction of a National Register of Citizens (NRC), meant to distinguish between legal and illegal citizens and based on a 2003 amendment of the citizenship act,\(^3\) had already sparked unrest in 2019 when first implemented in Assam. Muslims of migrant origin were now required to prove their citizenship which raised significant
questions for parts of the Muslim population of Northeast India many of whom had arrived from Bangladesh or former East Pakistan. The citizenship law reform sparked protest by primarily young civil society activists who had organised a large-scale sit-in in Delhi on 22 February 2020. On the following days, from 23 to 25 February 2020, BJP and RSS activists organised program-like systematic violence against the protesters and other Muslims in Delhi leading to further demonstrations and intense battles with police.

In yet another related development triggered by the Corona crisis, annual regional congregations of the missionary movement of the Tablighi Jama’at conducted with international participation in Delhi on 13-15 March were held responsible for the spread of the Corona virus. After that, Hindu nationalist firebrands targeted Muslims in general as a potential source of the virus. Muslim protest connected with those events was often organised by social grassroots activist, many of them Muslim, but by no means all, as the secular left across the religious and cultural spectrum also played a strong role in those responses. These dynamics again raised the question about Muslim voices and leadership in India. Observers pointed to the absence of Muslim leadership beyond the younger generation of those grassroots activists. Yet, as India’s Muslim population remains strongly divided along social, cultural, linguistic, sectarian, and geographic lines, Muslim activists in India cannot easily speak for the Indian Muslim community at large.

This essay will begin with an introduction to the historical context of Muslim India from which current popular leaders emerged. Three subsequent sections will discuss traditional, local or regional, and modern leadership, which are three categories into which Islam in India can be conditionally divided, keeping in mind that these areas also overlap. A final section on the role of social media for the mobilisation of Indian Muslims examines important new trends in social and political activism that are challenging and shaping India’s Muslim leadership.

**Historical formation of popular Muslim leadership**

After the Indian subcontinent was divided in 1947 as a result of the Pakistan independence movement, Islamic groups and Muslim leaders who remained in India faced a fundamental dilemma. In order to gain legitimacy with the Indian government and their major ally, the Indian National Congress, the remaining Indian Muslim groups and leaders needed to renounce politics. They wanted to distance themselves from the nightmare
legacy of partition that had rendered millions victim to communal rioting in
the process of the population transfers between the young states of India
and Pakistan. Yet partition had created a paradox for Muslim leadership in
South Asia: the centers of Islamic learning, theological guidance, of culture
and tradition remained in India and were largely absent from the new
Muslim state of Pakistan.

This inherent contradiction shaped the emergence of Muslim leadership
in India and also affected the emergence of new popular Muslim leaders
and their grassroots politics today in several ways. First, although no
Muslim political party has established itself in the electoral system of India
as a national force, the Muslim vote as a potential constituency continues
to influence a substantial number of seats in parliament. Second, Muslim
religious leaders remained devoted to the traditional conditions and forms
of the practice of Islam while demonstrating little to no political ambition of
their own. Third, national issues of Muslim politics have been taken up more
by mainstream political parties than by religious organisations. The
Congress Party and regional parties became prime movers in the public
arena to articulate the concerns of Indian Muslims, joined by a number of
clerics and public Muslim intellectuals, many of whom claimed the newly
emerging constituency of "secular Muslims". At the same time, fourth,
regional Muslim parties from South and East India generated a political
revival of Muslim voices, albeit fragmented and shaped by local culture and
ethnicity.

The emergence of Muslim leadership in independent India can be roughly
divided into three phases. During the first phase, immediately after parti-
tion, Indian Muslims had to grapple with the fact that despite the
emergence of Pakistan as a state of Muslim majority provinces, in the
independent state of India the issue of Muslim minority rights remained
unresolved politically, socially, and culturally. Muslims retained a significant
share in India’s population which continued to grow from 13.4 per cent in
2001, to 14.23 per cent in 2011, exerting influence in a number of regions.
At 172 million people in 2011, India’s Muslim population was roughly on
par with that of Pakistan and Bangladesh, each. Yet, the Indian Muslim
community also remained deeply divided, with the vast majority living in
the Gangetic plains of north India, the historical areas of Muslim civilisation
in the subcontinent, extending well into the East Indian states in the larger
Assam region, and a small but very active and much more developed
minority residing in the southern states, where Dravidian languages and
cultures dominated. During this first phase, Indian Muslim leaders
deliberately renounced political ambitions and focused on rebuilding the religious and cultural identity of the community.

A second phase was introduced by socio-economic and political changes that arrived with the modernisation processes of the 1970s, triggering the emergence of radical politics, regional, cultural, and ethnic conflict. Religious actors and groups with Hindu, Sikh, and also Muslim backgrounds became part of the identity politics of a new generation of mainly student activists. In the 1980s and 1990s, Muslim groups in India shared in the rising religious consciousness across the Muslim world and expanded religious institutions at a significant pace, not lagging much behind Pakistan or Bangladesh, albeit with very limited political drive.

Globalisation and development marked the third phase of the leaders’ evolving emergence. In this phase, Muslim activism in India intensely refocused on the status and development of the Indian Muslim community, especially general education, the schooling of girls, and professional, technical, and computer education. At the same time, leadership initiatives largely remained in the hands of upper-class and upper-caste Ashraf Muslims. The Muslim community was seen as lagging behind other communities in India and as not equally sharing in the fruits of the continuous development upsurge since the 1990s. This was confirmed by the 2006 Sachar Committee formed by the Indian government. More recent studies based on 2017-18 data stressed that this trend was continuing and still growing. The share of Muslims who completed graduation was 14 per cent in 2017-18, as against 18 per cent among the Dalits, 25 per cent among the Hindu Other Backward Castes group (OBCs), and 37 per cent among the Hindu upper castes.

The gap between the Muslims and Hindu OBCs was 7 percentage points (ppt) in 2011-12 and has gone up to 11 ppt now. The gap between all Hindus and Muslims widened from 9 ppt in 2011-12 to 11 ppt in 2017-18. Muslim groups and leaders felt the need and desire to network globally much more intensely than before. Using the new opportunities their global cooperation related not only to religious issues, but also reflected social, cultural and political concerns. As demonstrated by the Deobandis or Tablighis, the historical centers of religious Muslim networks in India regained some of their significance in the process. Their followers were joined by diverse activists from across India, some of whom followed a more local orientation while others were more modernist. The interconnection with the quickly growing Indian Muslim diaspora had a growing impact on local Muslim activism in India.
Traditional Muslim networks and new leadership formats

With the absence of a recognised national Muslim leadership, most religious-minded Indian Muslims continue to look for guidance to their local imams. Those include their elders in mosques, madaris (plural of madrasa, or Islamic school), and religious associations. These activists should be considered when looking for new trends in Muslim grassroots politics. Though still strongly divided by old sectarian differences, these local leaders adapt their modes of operation to new trends of communication. And they pay much more attention than previously to non-religious issues such as general education and development aimed at the social status of the Muslim community.

Increasingly, and more so under the BJP government since 2014, the religious scholars (ulama) negotiate with the government for public space of their communities. For this purpose, also communal inter-religious interaction is used such as direct talks with Hindu-nationalist RSS representatives. Emphasising the need to support a united India against separatism, the Ahl-i Hadith representative, Maulana Asghar Ali Imam Mahdi Salafi, surprised many political observers when in September 2019 he supported the Modi government on the abolition of paragraph 370 for Kashmir and also on the citizens register (NRC) which critical secular Muslim activists regarded as means to deem Muslim and Christian minorities as 'illegal immigrants.'

He also met with RSS representatives hailing the Supreme Court decision of 9 November 2019 regarding the Babri Masjid case in Ayodhya on a contested site where a Hindu temple and a Muslim mosque had been build over the centuries. They were joined in their support on Kashmir for the Modi government by the JUH and its General Secretary, Maulana Mahmood Madani, when they together met the Interior Minister of the Indian government, Amit Shah, in September 2019.

For the Shia, the Chairman of the Uttar Pradesh Central Shia Waqf Board, administering Shia religious endowments, Waseem Rizvi, tried to use the political impact of the Modi government decisions. He made the political—and sectarian—argument on 09 December 2019 that Shia should be included in the list of persecuted persons in the contentious citizenship act, due to the pressure and violence they were facing in Sunni majority countries in South and West Asia or the Middle East which would make them legitimate migrants in India. In India, it is hotly debated whether these religious leaders accommodate the BJP and RSS out of fear or out of social and political calculations in the face of a growing and resolute
generation of younger Muslim activists increasingly crossing the sectarian divides.

At the same time, these clerics contributed to the transformation of religious institutions. For their own communities, they built networks that encompass not only traditional religious associations operating out of madaris, but also modern Muslim schools teaching a secular curriculum, and madaris for girls along with modern girls’ schools. These schools are operated through Muslim NGOs that have expanded all over India. Often these institutions are cross-linked and coordinated by activists who bridge the religious and the secular realms effortlessly, as will be shown below. They are also engaged in business with, invest in, or direct some of the new Muslim media.

Over the years many centers of religious learning have built impressive websites containing a large amount of information. A prominent example is the traditional seminary of Deoband featuring information regarding curriculum, the history of the seminary, magazines in Urdu (Darul Ulum) and Arabic (al-Dai), ordering information for their books in Urdu and English, an online service for religious verdicts (fatawa), and a photo gallery. The other orthodox seminary of North India, Nadwatul Ulama, has taken a similar approach in its website, which provides easy connections with the seminary’s many Indian branches. The Deobandi-dominated JUH on its website introduces the association’s social and religious projects.

Adherents of the Barelwi tradition of Sufi-oriented Islam, which has locally appropriated the term Sunni, use modern media to connect to each other, although their institutions and associations are less formally organised. Internet blogs such as Sunni News not only help to circulate news and theological concepts but also promote sectarian debate. The youthful missionary movement of this tradition, Sunni Dawat-e Islami, which formed after the model of the Tablighi Jama’at and their Barelwi pendant, the Dawat-e Islami in Pakistan, possesses a modern web presence, offering podcasts, an e-journal, and e-books.

The Ahl-e Hadith in India led by the Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadees Hind (MJAH) is known for their strict legal approach focusing on the Quran and the Hadith while shunning the Muslim law schools. Their close association with Islamic institutions in Saudi Arabia earned them the connotation of Salafi—used primarily by themselves—and Wahhabi—used by others. At the same time, they have strong roots in local Muslim business communities.
In the Indian context, the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB, founded in 1972) acquired importance as a reference institution, which it further promoted through its website documenting its decisions. Run by ulama, the board’s decisions have a fatwa-like status, as it tries to reconcile different Sunni legal opinions. The board’s members also intervene in the making and reformation of Muslim Personal Law (MPL) on issues of marriage or divorce, sometimes causing much public controversy. The group’s chairman has often been vocal in public Indian discourse. Repeatedly the chairman has come from the Nadwa school; the previous chair was the famous Sayyid Ali Hasan Nadwi. The current chairman is Syed Mohammad Rabey Hasani. But its authority is not unchallenged as dissenting scholars with a Shia background and women activists formed rival boards, the All India Shia Personal Law Board (AISPLB), and the All India Muslim Women’s Personal Law Board (AIMWPLB) both founded in 2005.

MPL evolved under British rule when the courts started to make a selective reference to Islamic law while hearing civil cases involving Muslims and promoting legislation on its partial application. It was formalised when two related laws were adopted in 1937 (Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act) and 1939 (Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act). Today, the board is an interface of religious scholars with the Indian state and public Muslim intellectuals in legal matters arising from the prescriptions of Islam. The most recent example was the debate on the abolition of the Islamic divorce practice of pronouncing triple talaq (repudiation) for instant divorce without reconciliation. Although this debate had started much earlier, the BJP government heavily pushed for a decision. The Indian Supreme Court abolished the practice on 22 August 2017 and Parliament adopted the The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 criminalising the practice with retrograde effect from 19 September 2019. The traditional Islamic parties did not oppose the reform, the more as India’s Muslim neighbours had all reformed this practice already. But the AIMPLB rejected the legal intervention on behalf of the state.

In addition, individual scholars attract public attention through their participation in religious and political debates. Among the Deobandis, Maulana Nadeem ul-Wajidi is a typical example. A graduate of the Darul Ulum Deoband, he is a member of the working committee of the seminary’s alumni association. He is also president of the provincial organisation of Deobandi ulama for the province of Uttar Pradesh. Additionally, Maulana Nadeem ul-Wajidi runs his own online Deobandi madrasa, Darul Ulum
Online,\textsuperscript{27} and takes part in public debate through articles in Urdu language newspapers.

On the Barelwi side he is matched by scholars such as Maulana Muhammad Nasir Misbah\textsuperscript{28} and Allama Yasin Akhtar Nisbahi, owner of the Barelwi publishing house Darul Qalam.\textsuperscript{29} Tauqeer Raza Khan, the great-grandson of the Barelwi founder Ahmad Raza Khan (1856-1921), is involved in regional politics of the Uttar Pradesh state through the Ittehad-e-Millat Council (IMC) which was represented in the Uttar Pradesh (UP) Legislative Assembly 2012-17 from the Bhojipura Constituency.\textsuperscript{30} A vocal spokesman for religious Shia believers is Maulana Kalbe Sadiq, India’s best-known Shia Muslim scholar and vice president of the All India Muslim Personal Law Board.\textsuperscript{31} He, in contrast with Waseem Rizvi (as above), went out to support protesters against the new CAA law in Lucknow in January 2020.\textsuperscript{32}

The Madani family represents another prominent example of individual activism in the Islamic field. It is closely associated with the Deoband seminary, and the JUH. The family operates at the intersection of Muslim religious scholarship and party politics. Its members have struck various alliances with the Congress Party, the Samajwadi Party (SP) of Uttar Pradesh, the competing Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), and the Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD). At the same time they also support private secular schools in the region.\textsuperscript{33} Regional parties such as the SP and the BSP addressing the concerns of marginalised lower castes—like Dalits—and classes, also appealed to Muslim constituencies, primarily in Uttar Pradesh. So did the more left-leaning Janata Dal (United)—JDU—Party in Bihar. However they were often criticised for failing to contribute to the development of local Muslim communities despite their shares in power.\textsuperscript{34}

**Local Muslim initiatives and regional leadership in the South and East Indian States**

Historically the structure of religious debate and activism among Indian Muslims is dominated by the traditional sects of the Deobandis, Barelwis, Ahl-i Hadith (Salafi), Shia, and dissenting groups such as the Ahmadiyya (Reetz 2006). Yet recently, a growing number of local initiatives have transcended the demarcations of sectarian affiliations in India. This development is often connected with education and development projects to benefit local Muslim communities. More typically those projects are found in the southern Indian states (Kerala and Tamil Nadu) or on the east coast (Assam), outside the historical heartlands of Indian Islam in the north-Indian United Provinces and Bihar.
**Assam**

A typical example of this locally rooted activism is Badruddin Ajmal (born in 1955), a merchant of Arabian scents, hailing from Assam. He is a graduate of the Deoband seminary and helped modernise some of the seminary’s departments; for example, he was instrumental in introducing and expanding the teaching of English-language and computer skills there. In Hojai, Assam, Ajmal runs a welfare foundation and trust locally known for a state of the art charitable hospital (the Haji Abdul Majid Memorial Hospital and Research Center). He also established and directed Markaz-ul-Maarif (Center of Knowledge) in 1982, a successful NGO in the education sector operating in Assam, and a training institute for madrasa graduates, Markazul Maarif Education and Research Centre (MMERC) in 1994, which was founded in New Delhi and later shifted to Mumbai. In 2006, Ajmal founded a local Muslim party, the Assam United Democratic Front, which surprised observers by immediately winning eight seats of the state assembly. Since 2009, the party was renamed as All-India United Democratic Front. The party held 14 seats in the fourteenth Assam Assembly elected in 2016. Ajmal was re-elected to the national parliament for three consecutive terms from his Dhubri (Lok Sabha constituency).

**West Bengal**

The reformist Sufi Shrine of Furfura Sharif located in Hoogly district represents yet another type of social engagement of religious institutions. The five sons of the Shrine’s founder, Pir Abu Bakr Siddique (1859-1939), followed the concept of their father who was comparatively conservative for a Sufi cleric in that he opposed practices not enshrined in the Quran and the Hadith, such as singing, dancing, but also personal worship of shrinekeepers – the Pirs – like himself (Matin 2018: 28, 29). Their continuously growing impact was partly based on their cultivation of the Bengali language as another Muslim language of communication, besides Urdu and Persian. They extended a network of mosques, madaris and mixed religious-modern schools not only across West Bengal, the neighbouring states of Assam and Tripura, but also to Bangladesh and the Bengali-speaking diaspora in the UK and North America. Prominent representatives of the shrine network are Alama Pir Mohammad Saifuddin Siddique, the Chief Patron of Furfura Sharif and eldest grand-son of Abu Bakr Siddique, as well as Ibrahim and Kasem Siddique who are also engaged in local politics challenging the Triamol Congress Party TCP. Local followers
increasingly treat them like local governance representatives when asking for their interventions to solve problems of getting access to schools, hospitals etc.\textsuperscript{42}

\textit{Kerala}

Similar local initiatives have been established in Kerala. This southwestern state is known for its high literacy, an influential but moderate Communist movement, and a strong Christian minority influence. It also has a close-knit Muslim community of the so-called Moplahs who can be traced all the way back to the advent of Islam on Indian soil. In Kerala, local branches of all-India associations have gone their own way by resolutely introducing quality education not only on Islam but also on general subjects. These groups are active in interfaith dialogue and social rehabilitation. This notably applies to the Samastha Kerala Jamiat-ul-Ulema broadly following the Sufi/Barelwi doctrinal orientation. It was founded in 1926 and split into two factions in 1984 named after their leaders, E.K. Aboobacker Musliyar (1957-96) and A.P. Aboobacker Musliyar (b. 1931). The EK faction engaged with the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) whereas the AP faction is said to support left-wing politics in the state. Also the IUML itself split into factions which took turns in participating in alternating coalition politics of the state (cf. Prabhash 2000). Except for the second term 1957-62 when its representative joined as an independent, the IUML was continuously present in the national parliament of India with one to three deputies since the first parliamentary elections in 1952, though with a distinctly local and regional flavor. It was under the Congress-led government of Manmohan Singh in 2004, that its representative was holding a ministerial post in the federal government, E. Ahamed as Minister of State of External Affairs.\textsuperscript{43}

In Kerala, it switched between coalitions with Congress and the local Communist Party.

\textit{Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh}

The IUML also has visible influence in the southeastern state of Tamil Nadu.\textsuperscript{44} In this state, Muslim groups and institutions have revived in a major way that is strongly marked by local Tamil culture and ethno-nationalism. Another distinct local center of Islamic tradition and activism is Hyderabad, once the capital of the famed principality of the Nizam of Hyderabad and today part of Telangana.\textsuperscript{45} In both Tamil Nadu and Hyderabad a number of small militant groups emerged in the past that either were quickly dispersed or were suppressed by the state security forces. In both
states, Muslim NGOs significantly increased their involvement in the education of local Muslims. In the local politics of Hyderabad, the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen continues to play an important role for Muslim mobilisation. The articulate barrister Asaduddin Owaisi for the fourth time retained the party seat in the seventeenth assembly of the national parliament (Lok Sabha) elected in May in 2019. Although sometimes dubbed Islamist, this party is more moderate and community-oriented in character. It recently expanded all-India activities seeking to bridge sectarian divides and ethno-political polarisation among Indian Muslims. A second AIMIM deputy, Syed Imtiaz Jaleel, represented Aurangabad constituency in Maharashtra in the same assembly.

**Jammu and Kashmir**

The former northern state of Jammu and Kashmir presented a special case as it had been contested between India and Pakistan since the time of partition. Since 1990 particularly, the Kashmir valley has been marked by an insurgency that has been fuelled partly by Pakistan-based groups and government agencies. The Indian-controlled part of the state had a Muslim majority of 68.31 per cent that tended to favor either the Congress Party or one of the local Muslim parties. 4 out of 22 districts had been Hindu-, one Buddhist majority districts, all other Muslim majority.

When the BJP government abolished article 370 of the Indian constitution thereby revoking the special status of the Jammu and Kashmir state on 5 August 2019, it converted the state into 2 Union Territories (UT) enjoying less political and administrative independence, the Buddhist-majority Ladakh UT and the Muslim-majority Jammu & Kashmir UT with effect from 31 October 2019. To stifle political dissent the government imposed harsh limitations on local Muslim political parties and their leaders many of which were put under house arrest. Communication on the internet was restricted and public curfews were imposed repeatedly. Security forces used the restrictions which were also ascerbated by the Corona pandemic to confront Kashmir resistance fighters in their hide-outs.

Before that constitutional intervention despite the many years of conflict, Muslim politics had developed in full diversity. The two most well-known parties had been the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (NC)—led by Omar Abdullah (b. 1970), and the Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party (PDP)—led by Mehbooba Mufti (b. 1959). The latter was the last chief minister from 2016 to 2018 before the restructuring, in a coalition with the BJP which withdrew from the coalition government on 19 June
2018\textsuperscript{50} after which the state was governed, first by the Governor, and then by President’s rule.\textsuperscript{51} Central rule continues in the UT after 31 October through the new Lieutenant-Governors. The main ideological and political support for the insurgency came from the Jama’at-i Islami Jammu and Kashmir (JIJK - Islamic Party), which, although autonomous and historically predating partition, is strongly influenced by its Pakistan-based sister party.\textsuperscript{52} In Indian-controlled Kashmir, it was banned for 5 years under the \textit{Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967} on 28 February 2019, right after militants had attacked an army convoy on 14 February 2019.\textsuperscript{53} Its affiliated militant organisation Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HuM)\textsuperscript{54} is operating in the territory while its leader Sayeed Salahudeen (b. 1946) is residing on the Pakistan-controlled side of the state. Its last local commander Riyaz Naikoo was killed during a security force operation in his native village of Beighpora in south Kashmir on 04 May 2020.\textsuperscript{55}

The JIJK is a member of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) that unites appx. 26 organisations favoring either joining Pakistan, independence or at least strong autonomy for the territory.\textsuperscript{56} Hurriyat consists of three factions due to political differences how to approach the current situation in the state. One of the factions is currently led by Mirwaiz Mohammad Umar Farooq (b. 1973) who as the leading cleric (Mirwaiz) of the UT is also conducting the Friday prayers in the Srinagar historical mosque. Although Muslim leaders from Kashmir have little impact on politics elsewhere in India, the conflict in itself has often served to polarise Muslim activists across the country and to motivate militant and radical elements. While the political and social tension is running high—notably since the revocation of the autonomous status, the militant conflict level seems comparatively low, partly because the present leadership in Pakistan is careful not to give the BJP reasons for further confrontation, and partly because of the extensive security clampdown.

Since 1990 the Kashmir valley also saw a significant rise in religious engagements of Muslims. Most prominent are the Tablighi Jama’at—and its local headquarter at the Bait-al-Kareem Mosque in Srinagar in Tawheed Abad in Srinagar,\textsuperscript{57} its competitor from the Barelwi missionary movement, Dawat-i Islami, at the Fazain-e-Madina centre at Jamalatta, Srinagar,\textsuperscript{58} and also groups of the Ahl-i Hadith\textsuperscript{59} and Shia. The latter are a dominant force in the Kargil district, UT Ladakh.\textsuperscript{60}

Muslim politicians particularly took issue with the new domicile law which was introduced for the UT Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh on 20 May 2020.\textsuperscript{61} It replaced another abrogated constitution article 35A which had hitherto
reserved employment and property access to local residents. The new law allowed to issue new domicile certificates to Indian citizens for the territory which was strictly controlled under the previous arrangements. Muslim politicians argue this move betrays the political intent of the government to ultimately change the demographic composition of Jammu and Kashmir in favour of non-Muslim citizens. This would potentially remove its Muslim majority status among the Indian states and territories.\textsuperscript{62} Government representatives contended it was unfair not to grant such privileges to local citizens who had lived in the state for 70 years without getting such privileges. This notably concerned central government servants. This move was supposedly meant also to favour economic migration thereby accelerating economic development in Jammu and Kashmir.\textsuperscript{63}

**Modernising Muslim leadership**

The modernisation of Muslim leadership was primarily driven by lay Muslims and the demands of development. It was fuelled by discontent with a continuing concentration of leadership in the hands of "Ashraf" Muslims representing upper class and caste strata. Religious conflict with Hindu nationalists also provoked new leadership aspirations. Changes took shape through the formation of new bodies and institutions. They were different in maintaining a separate identity from both the established sectarian religious associations and the mainstream political parties that had previously been the main outlets for Muslim public opinion. In practice, however, a number of links exist. Broadly speaking, these modern organisations can be divided in two categories: those related to religious issues and those related to community welfare, education and social rights. At the same time existing institutions for religious education underwent gradual changes by incorporating secular subjects both for vocational training and regular academic qualification.

Nowadays it is an important career opportunity for Indian Muslims to become involved in Muslim NGOs. Many Muslim graduates, not only of religious schools but also of secular schools, opt to start new NGOs only to create jobs for themselves. These fusion tenancies have led to increasing visibility of Muslim secularism which is a long-standing feature of cultural and political life of modern India.

In addition we see growing grassroots engagement on social and political issues where often the student community is involved. The educational trajectory of Muslim students increasingly underwent transformation where students at public universities like the JNU are publicly defending their
Muslim identity and where students from religious schools and sectarian organisations get involved in public mass activism. This activism was partly feeding on communal and social tension and cleavages continuously and more recently also increasingly faced by Muslims of marginalised social background. Occasionally and regionally it also generated militancy or local collaboration with international militant networks.

Modern Muslim religious institutions

In the area of religious institutions, there are a number of Muslim think-tanks and NGOs that currently exert a significant influence on religious debate and mobilisation. A representative example is the Institute of Objective Studies (IOS) in Delhi, directed by Mohammed Manzoor Alam (b. 1945). The institute appears close to the Jamaat-i Islami-i Hind (JIH) and its modernising aspirations. In religious matters, the IOS follows the orthodoxy of Deoband and the JIH. The IOS has also become a recognised player in the academic field, attracting professors from public universities and circulating its own academic journals. Through a variety of interlinked institutions, IOS exerts a wide influence on religious-minded Muslim intellectuals. The group’s chairman, Manzoor Alam, is also the general secretary of the Delhi All India Milli Council (AIMC), which promotes public initiatives in the area of Muslim personal law and tries also to reconcile different sectarian approaches. The AIMC has generated a number of independent regional branches for Rajasthan, North Gujarat, Karnataka/Bangalore, etc. Ideologically these institutions follow the Islamisation of knowledge initiative. The IOS is listed as the Indian affiliation of the International Institutes of Islamic Thought, which are part of the same network as the Islamic Universities of Pakistan and Malaysia. The Milli Council, in turn, is in close contact with the All India Muslim Personal Law Board.

Modern Muslim community welfare institutions

Those institutions related to the welfare of the community are typically training centers or private schools with government-recognised degree courses in all levels of education: primary, secondary, and tertiary. Lately many religious associations and madaris have created such educational facilities. According to inquiries in Deoband town, out of one thousand girls attending a girls’ madrasa—a new rising phenomenon in itself—’at least 40 per cent want to work [...] .Many girls from madrasas go on to join colleges and institutes run by madrasa alumni in cities such as Meerut, Muzaffarnagar and Aligarh. Another interesting example is the Jame-ul-uloom at
the Jamia Mosque in Bangalore which encompasses not only religious courses but also secular programmes from girls education to technical vocational training and college degrees.\(^7^3\) The so-called high-tech madrasa Jamiatul Hidayat in Jaipur, Rajasthan,\(^7^4\) which is named after Maulana Mohammed Hidayat Ali Mojaddidi, and currently run by Maulana Mohammad Fazlur Rahim Mujaddidi, established full-fledged public education courses for secondary and technical education in addition to religious courses.\(^7^5\) They also launched a number of related institutions such as the English medium Imam Rabbani Public Schools in different cities of the region.\(^7^6\)

In the field of higher education the private Darul Huda Islamic University (DIHU) in Chemmad, and the Al Jamia Al Islamia (JI), Santhapuram, Kerala,\(^7^7\) deserve special attention.\(^7^8\) They offer courses that integrate religious education with secular subjects, such as Maths, Social Sciences, History, Physics, and Chemistry. In addition, the JI parent foundation Islamic Mission Trust (IMT) Santhapuram, founded the Al Jamia Arts & Science College in 2010, affiliated with the University of Calicut.\(^7^9\) They are seen as having upgraded Islamic education to a high-quality public education level while also adding options for further studies in the arts and sciences.\(^8^0\)

The All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat (AIMMM) must also be mentioned here. The AIMMM is a coordination council where public intellectuals and Muslim clerics sit together to discuss Muslim issues. Although in itself the council does not have a great impact on the Muslim masses, the AIMMM has nevertheless helped coordinate and articulate public Muslim aspirations in India to a notable degree. Between 2012-15, the council was led by Zafarul-Islam Khan (b. 1948), a Muslim intellectual who combines his activities in the media business through the community newspaper *Milli Gazette*\(^8^1\) with public activism and charity toward the Muslim community through his registered trust, the Charity Alliance.\(^8^2\) Being the son of Maulana Wahiduddin Khan (see p. 21), Khan passed through traditional madrasa education (Nadwa) and secular schooling (he possesses a PhD from Manchester University). The current general secretary of the AIMMM is Mujtaba Farooq who continues coordination activities among Muslim groups and institutions. He is also the Director of Public Relations for the JIH.\(^8^3\)
Students and grassroots street activism

The inter-religious violence in the Indian state of Gujarat in 2002 primarily directed by Hindu radicals against Muslims became another watershed for Muslim mobilisation. It also rekindled the memory of the destruction of the Babur Mosque in Ayodhya on 6 December 1992 by militant Hindu nationalists (cf. Hasan 1997). These events created a strong impulse to counter anti-Muslim activities more forcefully. New initiatives for a more politicised Islamist leadership however largely remained a fringe phenomenon. The most prominent was the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) that existed between 1977 and 2001 (Arosoaie 2018; Fair 2010). It was founded as the student wing of the JIH at the campus of Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) in Uttar Pradesh. After a period of Islamist student activism while running numerous ideological magazines in Urdu, SIMI was banned in September 2001 after 9/11 under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967 (UAPA). SIMI was alleged to have endorsed Jihad and the establishment of a Caliphate governance system in India and South Asia. It praised al-Qaeda, the Taliban and condemned the US intervention in Afghanistan.

Supposedly it was also linked with other Pakistan-based terrorist organisations, such as Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e Mohammadi (JeM) which were associated with bombing attacks in Indian cities since 2000. Since then the ban has been renewed under the said Act every two years, most recently 31 January 2019. Under recent modifications of UAPA, critics argued that practically no checking of evidence is condoned anymore. The immediate involvement of SIMI cadres in militant acts before their ban remained contentious. But a certain faction and several of its former members apparently engaged in the Indian Mujahidin (IM), a militant outfit that supposedly emerged in 2001 after the last public convention of SIMI. The IM were held responsible for several rounds of bomb attacks and explosive devices. Their theological foundations though seemed questionable as they appeared more to be driven by frustrations of marginalised urban Muslim youth taking gangster-style revenge of anti-Muslim riots and campaigns in the 1990s and 2000s.

As the wide-spread former intellectual cader of SIMI was continuing its ideological commitment, SIMI’s ban is said to have generated new activist initiatives. Groups such as the Movement for the Revival of the Global Muslim Community, the Ummah (Tehreek-e-Ahyaa-e-Ummat, TEU), the Movement for Students at Arabic Schools, madrasas (Tehreek-Talaba-e-Arabia, TTA), the Movement for the Protection of Islamic Monuments and
Symbols (Tahrik Tahaffuz-e-Sha‘ir-e-Islam, TTSI) and the Islamic Union (Wahdat-e-Islami)\textsuperscript{87} created platforms for madrasa students, clerics and political activists. Publications such as the \textit{Islamic Voice},\textsuperscript{88} produced by Sadathullah Khan from Bengaluru since 1987, were part of the larger ideological and religious network loosely affiliated with the JIH, partly because of its concept reconciling belief with political and civic engagement.

But since 1981, and more formally since its ban 2001, the JIH had distanced itself from SIMI and rather promoted its own Students Islamic Organisation of India (SIO).\textsuperscript{89} Their dissent was characteristic of the different political engagements where SIMI opposed Arafats visit to India in 1981 whom it regarded as a Western "puppet" while JIH regarded him as a symbol of Palestinian politics.\textsuperscript{90}

The SIO over the years became more engaged in society and public life. It invested in political, intellectual and academic activities where it increasingly identified with the values and demands of the constitution of India that it now under the Modi government felt compelled to defend in the name of Muslims being one of the marginalised communities of India.\textsuperscript{91} Many of their current leaders hail from highly developed regions of India, such as Telangana, Andhra Pradesh, Tamilnadu and Kerala.\textsuperscript{92} This is an interesting contrast with the long-time dominance of public Islamic engagement by north-Indian entities partly promoting the heritage of the Moghul empire. Some of the SIO public functions and debates on the other hand, address both political activists and a more general public and also academic audience. This was demonstrated by conferences such as the "All India History Summit" on 29, 30 September 2018,\textsuperscript{93} and the "India International Islamic Academic Conference of the SIO" on 8-9 October 2016.\textsuperscript{94} The SIO also increasingly engaged in urban street activism. It played a major role during the protests against the modified CAA law. Two female students and SIO activists, Ladeeda Sakhaloon and Ayesha Renna, became the female faces of the confrontational protest at the Jamia Millia University Delhi on 12 December 2019.\textsuperscript{95} Also the protest in Indian-controlled Kashmir was strongly influenced by SIO activists. While liberal and secular activists first hailed them, they later attacked their commitment to religious slogans and values.

\textit{Muslim secularism and social marginalisation in India}

Yet, over the years the nature of secular activism has also pluralised. In South Asia, and notably in India, it is common that Muslim activists who would identify themselves as secular or secularists have been significantly
articulate in the public arena. This approach is inspired by the Indian interpretation of secularism in the tradition of Gandhi. It is based on the separation of state and religion while showing each religion equal respect and protection. For secular Muslims, matters of faith are private. A prime example of such an activist was Asghar Ali Engineer (1939-2013), founder and director of the Mumbai Center for the Study of Society and Secularism (CSSS) which is currently led by his son Irfan Engineer. Asghar Ali Engineer was a Bohra Ismaili and received religious training from his father who was a cleric. As a public intellectual, Engineer wrote extensively on the civil, economic, and social rights of the Muslim community from a center-left perspective. An equally well-known and vocal representative of this group was Mushirul Hasan (1949-2018), an outstanding, widely published historian and former vice chancellor of Jamia Millia University. Politically Hasan was associated with the Muslim voice in the Congress Party.

The social concerns of mainly low-class Muslims have been championed by secular and left-leaning groups such as the All India Backward Muslim Morcha (AIBMM) founded by Dr. Ejaz Ali in 1994 (Khanam 2013). The Pasmanda (Backward) Muslim Mahaz (Front) PMM was founded by Ali Anwar Ansari in 1998 in Patna, Bihar. These organisations aspired to represent Muslims who are descended from Hindu converts standing outside the caste system as so-called outcasts or Dalits (Sikand 2007). Hindu nationalists have denied this status to outcast-origin Muslims and Christians. The Constitution (Scheduled Castes - SC) Order, 1950 deliberately excluded all non-Hindus from caste-based affirmative action programmes, although those were later extended to Sikhs and Buddhists: '[...]' 3. Notwithstanding anything contained in paragraph 2, no person who professes a religion different from the Hindu, the Sikh or the Buddhist religion shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste.'

It is in the light of such rulings adopted not under BJP but Congress rule, that the Muslim protest against the new citizenship law CAA gained momentum as Muslim citizens are potentially turned into aliens, it is argued. Yet the complexity of the issue is highlighted by the fact that certain sections of Muslim Dalits, notably Muslim refugees in West Bengal and other states of the North-East, have supported the BJP and the new citizenship reform because they believe 'that the CAA makes it possible for them to acquire Indian citizenship' by providing documents of their Indian citizen status whereas the original citizenship law automatically identified Muslim refugees as illegal immigrants where they potentially faced arrest or ended up in a detention camp.
Social media and new trends in India’s Muslim leadership

Over the last 20 years, the radical expansion of social media platforms and their influence has transformed grassroots mobilisation of Muslims in India. These changes affected as much the religious institutions and networks, as the political, social and educational. On the side of preaching this impact has examplarily been embodied by the continuing and expanding country-wide and global mobilisation of followers of the Tablighi Jama’at, the Sunni Deobandi preaching movement, with its national and global headquarters in Nizamuddin, Delhi. Another prime example has been the growing national and international impact of the televangelism of Zakir Naik following the conservative and purist Ahl-i Hadith doctrine.

Their rise exemplifies several elements of the new trends in popular Muslim leadership. They both draw heavily on the newfound religiosity among the rising middle classes of urban India, indicating both the potential but also the limits of this appeal. Though this phenomenon of religious resurgence may be of comparatively recent origin among Indian Muslims, it is not confined to them. Similar middle-class religiosity has been helping the ascent of the Hindu-nationalist forces of the BJP since the 1990s. Their success also points to the importance of new formats and media in pursuing religious propagation. They both reflect national as well as global trends. They are intensely religious but at the same time also appeal to secular trends such as rising social engagement of the younger generation and a growing market competition of religious formats.

The Tablighi Jama’at heavily intensified its engagement with the social media partly as a result of internal conflicts over leadership and the direction of its theological and organisational orientation. In November 2015 a conflict emerged over the succession of leadership where the Indian centre (Markaz) in Nizamuddin, Delhi, and its leader (Amir), Maulana Saad Kandhelawi (b. 1965), found themselves in tense conflict with the centre in Pakistan at Raiwind, near Lahore, and the global council of the movement—Alami Shura—anarched there. The conflict also developed into a conceptual argument whether the preaching movement is to be led properly by a Shura or an Amir. The Shura which had been re-configured at the annual meeting (ijtima’) in Raiwind in November 2015 challenged Maulana Saad while he challenged the re-composition of the Shura without his participation.

The disagreement developed into a quarrel and contest for leadership prompting the emergence of two rival factions which primarily through social media mobilisation have now established themselves world-wide. In
the process both factions established new social media accounts that squarely attacked the other side, on Facebook, YouTube and Twitter. Confrontation between the factions also expanded beyond South Asia globally, notably to the UK.\textsuperscript{103} Yet followers seemed to be undeterred to take sides in the rivalry. Some of the online testimony suggests that this in fact has led to a further growth of the movement where both factions now hold their meetings, in almost all Muslim communities and countries in parallel. Other testimony suggests that many followers now take part in the sessions of both the factions.\textsuperscript{104}

The continuing strong mass appeal of the movement became evident also during the Corona pandemy when heavily-attended events in India (and other countries) turned into hotspots of infections. While this phenomenon was not unlike religious gatherings in other parts of the world, in India the Hindu nationalists used the occasion to label the virus a Muslim scourge. This debate largely played out through social media. The Tablighi Jama’at was first on the defensive as it also had initially talked down the virus threat. After its infected activists recovered, the TJ mobilised its followers to offer themselves as donators of blood for plasma treatment of patients thereby hoping to counter the ideological and political campaign against them.\textsuperscript{105}

Zakir Naik’s organisation, the Islamic Research Foundation (IRF), represented the type of missionary "dawa" activism that provoked inter-sectarian tension and generated increasing political pressure in South Asia. After a terrorist attack in the name of Islam at a café in Dhaka, Bangladesh, in 2016, one of the attackers was allegedly inspired by Naik’s preaching. Bangladesh authorities soon banned Naik’s Online Television Channel Peace TV. India followed suit and the Indian government imposed a 5-year ban on his IRF institute on 17 November 2016 for radicalising Muslim youth and masses 'to commit terrorist attacks' while also addressing alleged money-laundering.\textsuperscript{106} India started extradition proceedings with Malaysia where Naik had gone and where he had received a permanent residence status. While this process did not significantly diminish his impact on national and global Islamic online communication, it led several formats in India to currently observing a cautious distance. For instance, the religious website *Islamic Voice* (a.o.) no longer features his contributions on its website.\textsuperscript{107} After the ban its editorial "Reflections on a Ban" in December 2016 distanced the journal from his sectarian views which were argued to lack compassion towards other faiths and seen as incompatible with religions and faiths being a 'private domain of individual in a secular society.'\textsuperscript{108}
But Naik did not only represent an ideological commitment. Socially his project reflected the growing importance of competition and of market forces in the religious field. His theological trajectory was proto-typical for other new Islamic preachers: he went from being a former follower of popular Islam with Sufi roots when he was a student of Ahmed Deedat, who hailed from a Barelwi background, to a very activist reformist position that some described as Islamist and others as Salafi.

Naik’s project in many ways was a media ministry. The new media formats are very much connected with the global communication revolution in the wake of globalisation. He refined media techniques such as the production and dissemination of CDs, video courses, and in 2006 the online television channel, Peace TV, in addition to conventional print propaganda. At the same time, Zakir Naik’s project was a personal ministry, where his own religious persona became the main focus of his preaching. This format was also adopted by Wahiduddin Khan (born in 1925) who preaches a considerably less ideological, liberal and non-sectarian combination of Islamic scholarship, Sufi traditions, and New Age influences, especially by networking through his journal Al Risala. Khan enthusiastically embraced the new media and lectures live on Internet TV in English and Urdu. Several clerics and preachers—Sufi and reformist alike—have followed this model, for instance the school and Sufi order of Hazrat Inam Hasan Gudri Shah Baba V in Ajmer.

Naik’s project became also a global ministry. Like Naik, many Indian Muslim groups and leaders developed expanding networks through diaspora connections and websites. This particularly applies to the United Kingdom and the United States, but also to other parts of the world where the Indian Muslim diaspora is strong, such as South Africa and Mauritius.

Yet Naik’s impact is inflated and twisted by the same media that has helped him to rise. Naik’s authority is hotly contested in India, to the extent that traditional groups have released fatwas targeting his arguments and technique of debate as un-Islamic. The unanimity with which this critique was voiced from the Deobandi, Barelwi, and even Ahl-i Hadith perspectives reflects not only the aspect of competition between Naik and the more traditional groups. It also demonstrates the limits of Naik’s religious authority which remains confined to particular sections of Muslim society with a modernist educational background.

Although Zakir Naik brought the use of these formats to certain perfection, he was by no means the first or only one in South Asian Islam going in this direction. The sect of the Ahmadiyya, seen as heretical by most
mainstream Muslims, first started a television channel for its followers in 1994. Relayed over the Internet, the channel allowed the sect’s followers to receive messages irrespective of repressions and restrictions it faced in many countries.

Many groups have established dedicated channels at YouTube, introducing video activism as a tool for Muslim mobilisation. Ahl-i Hadith scholars from India established a missionary center in Saudi Arabia, the Jeddah Dawah Center (JDC), which runs an Internet television channel on YouTube.com, Noor TV. Among the Tablighi Jama’at, the Deobandi-dominated missionary movement that originally was hostile to media coverage, young lay preachers have became enthusiastic video activists, though less in India and more often in Great Britain and Pakistan. Barelwi activists also have started a dedicated Sunni channel on YouTube.com devoted to refuting sectarian opponents.

Competition in the faith market has become tough and tight. But as with all media revolutions, the resulting impact is not uniform. In some cases new media has exacerbated ideological and sectarian tension—for example, when Ahl-i Hadith preachers use their YouTube channel to vehemently attack the Tablighi Jama’at and its literature. In other cases, however, as with grassroots video activists of the Tablighi Jama’at, new media has challenged previous inhibitions towards picture and media content, thereby increasing knowledge and transparency. Even the current faction struggle can also be read as some form of internal democratisation allowing members to have a voice in the shaping of their formats. The same applies to the website revolution among Islamic groups. For some groups, greater use of the Internet has increased the potential to attack adversaries, while others feel compelled to take a more pragmatic and open approach.

**Implications for the intersection of religion and politics**

Currently no charismatic national Muslim leaders on a popular level are visible in India. Despite the growing prominence of individual leaders such as Asaduddin Owaisi, Muslim leadership and religious authority in India are still essentially local, whether conservative or progressive, reformist or Sufi, political or social and cultural. Given the diversity and fragmentation of Indian Muslims, this is not likely to change anytime soon.

At the same time, the choice of ministries has dramatically increased. Traditional Muslim networks have used the opportunities provided by the media and globalisation age to revive their hold on their adherents. But so
too have new activists managed to establish themselves successfully in the Islamic field, notably from the SIO.

More than anything else, Islamic action and debate in India are framed by the social and economic condition of the Muslim community. Muslim clerics and intellectuals increasingly go public with their positions and demands. The lines of distinction between religious, social, and political activism have grown more blurred than before. Muslims are availing of the public and democratic space in India not only to secure and defend their rights but also to propagate their views in all their diversity.

Although the main national political parties will not likely be replaced in the representation of Muslim interests, on a local and regional level Muslim leaders will increasingly act independently. They will thus strengthen communal politics but also contribute to empowering marginalised sections of society. It will depend on the major political parties how well this potential for mobilisation is successfully integrated into the mainstream.

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**Endnotes**


All links have been accessed on 01 September 2020.


6 Rajindar Sachar et al. 2006. *Social, economic and educational status of the Muslim community in India: a report.* New Delhi: Government of India, November,
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The committee studied quota demands for Muslims in general and for *Dalit* (low-class) Muslims in particular, on which no agreement could be achieved. The committee confirmed a less than average performance of Muslims in literacy and educational achievements; lower Muslim representation among the professional and managerial classes; less availability of loans; less educational, rural, and urban civic infrastructure; and fewer income and state service opportunities for Muslims.


14 For information on the Deoband seminary, see its website at http://www.darululoom-deoband.com/.

15 For information on Nadwatul Ulama and its branches, see the seminary’s official website at http://nadwatululama.org/.

16 For the official website of the Jamiat-Ulama-i-Hind, see https://www.jamiat.org.in.

17 See, for example, the internet blog Sunni News at http://sunninews.wordpress.com/.

18 For the official website of the Sunni Dawat-e Islami movement, see http://www.sunnidawateislami.net.
19 https://www.ahlehadees.org/

20 'The Ahle Hadeeth or the Salafis, popularly but contemptuously referred to as the Wahabis, are a constituent group of Sunni Muslims.' Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadees Hind. Aims and Objectives, https://www.ahlehadees.org/markazi-jamiat-ahle-hadees-hind/.

21 For the official website of the All India Muslim Law Board, see http://www.aimplboard.in/.


23 See their official website https://www.aisplb.com/.

24 See their official website https://www.aimwplb.com/.


27 For the official website of Darul Ulum Online, see https://www.darululoomonline.org/.


30 http://uplegisassembly.gov.in/Members/main_members_en.aspx#Data/12337/16.


35 For the official website of the Ajmal Foundation, see http://ajmalfoundation.org/.

36 For the official website of Markaz-ul-Maarif, see http://www.markazulmaarif.org/.
37 For an introduction to Markazul Maarif Education and Research Centre, see http://www.markazulmaarif.org/mmerc.asp.

38 http://ia.rediff.com/election/assamdetail06.htm.


40 http://loksabhaph.nic.in/Members/MemberBioprofile.aspx?mpsno=4436.

41 The increasingly global impact of Furfura Sharif was also highlighted by their International Conference devoted to the centenary celebration of the founder Pir Abu Bakr Siddique, on 14-15 January 2017, cf. the speeches of participants on the YouTube channel Shah Abu Bakr Memorial Trust, https://www.youtube.com/c/ShahAbuBakrMemorialTrust/videos, among them also the author who participated on 14 Jan 17.

42 Cf. their official account, Pir Abu Bakar Siddique Youtube Channel – PABS, on Facebook (https://www.facebook.com/pirabs/) and YouTube (https://www.youtube.com/PirabubakarsiddiquePABS).


44 For the official website of the Tamil Nadu State Indian Union Muslim League, see http://muslimleague.tn.com.


46 For the official website of the All India Majlis-e-Itehadul Muslimeen, see https://www.aimim.org/.


54 Their website is operating though frequently infested with malware: http://hizbmedia.net/.


56 Cf. their official website at
http://www.huriyatconference.com/.
57 https://goo.gl/maps/zwLTywKpwY1Sm6tK6.
58 https://goo.gl/maps/xmfURovDApghfzM1A.
60 https://www.facebook.com/ShiasOfKargil/.


64 For the official website of the Institute of Objective Studies, see http://www.iosworld.org/.
65 For information on the structure of Institute of Objective Studies, see http://www.iosworld.org/content.aspx?id=368.
68 https://www.facebook.com/groups/171658279705544.
69 https://www.facebook.com/groups/1814403528783226/.
70 https://www.facebook.com/groups/1814403528783226/.

71 For the reference to the IOS on the website of the International Institute of Islamic Thought, see https://iiit.org/en/offices-affiliates/.

74 For more information on Jamiatul Hidaya, see https://www.facebook.com/pg/Jamea.Tul.Hidaya/.
76 Pervez Bari. 2014. Jaipur’s Rabbani SS School to upgrade to college level, spread wings: Maulana Mujaddidi. Muslim Mirror, 18 Dec.,

77 https://www.aljamiia.net/.

78 http://www.dhiu.in/.


80 On the role of these institutions, see also Gry Hvass Pedersen. 2016. The role of Islam in Muslim higher education in India: the case of Jamia Millia Islamia in New Delhi. Review of Middle East Studies, 50 (1), pp. 28-37.

81 For more information on the Milli Gazette, see http://www.milligazette.com/.

82 For more information on the Charity Alliance, see http://www.charityalliance.in/.

83 For Mujtaba Farooq; see his Twitter account at @muitabafarooq, https://twitter.com/muitabafarooq.


84 See the government notification at http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2019/196301.pdf.


92 See the composition of their Central Leadership at https://sio-india.org/.


96 For more information on the Mumbai Center for the Study of Society and Secularism, see http://www.csss-isla.com/.

97 For biographical information about Mushirul Hasan, see


Cf. the respective accounts of the factions as above.


Cf. Fn 88, the websites current editions as compared to its archived editions as in December 2006: https://islamicvoice.com/December2006/Facts%26Faith/.


For more information about the Islamic Research Foundation, see https://www.irfi.org/; https://www.facebook.com/IRF.net/.

For more information on the journal Al Risala, see
http://www.alrisala.org/.


112 For more details on this Sufi order, see the Sufi-Mystic.net website, http://www.sufi-mystic.net/index2.htm.

113 See, for example, the U.S.-based Internet portals Indian Muslims, http://www.indianmuslims.info/, and New Age Islam, http://newageislam.net. The latter started in the United States but has now transferred to India. New Age Islam’s organizers describe themselves as ‘a group of Muslims, South Asian, but based mostly in the Middle East and North America, concerned at the present state of affairs in which the very word Muslim has become synonymous with terrorism, backwardness and ignorance.’ For more information, see About Us in a Nutshell, New Age Islam website, http://newageislam.net/NewAgeIslamAboutUs.aspx.


116 For more information on the Jeddah Dawah Center, see http://www.jdci.org.

117 For the dedicated channel of the Jeddah Dawah Center on YouTube, see http://www.youtube.com/user/NNoorTV, after YouTube blocked the early version NoorTV.

118 See, for example, the channel of YouTube user Munimmiah786, who apparently is a Tabligh activist, at http://www.youtube.com/user/munimmiah786.

119 For the Barelwi channel, see Exposing Nifaq (hypocrisy), at http://www.youtube.com/user/ExposingNifaq.
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